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Welcome to the Nineties, Bindrim v.




More than ten years have passed since the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari to Bindrim v. Mitchell, the California suit that
expanded the scope of an author's potential to libel through a work of
fiction.1 Although Bindrim enters another decade essentially intact,
questions remain regarding its practical validity. Decisions since then
have limited the application of defamation to fictional works, with im-
portant ramifications for both artists and courts everywhere. This Note
will evaluate these decisions and define current law for artists, publishers,
and their representatives. A plea is made for more judicial reform in this
area. Let the reader be warned, however, that this Note seeks to illumi-
nate not the law of any particular jurisdiction, but rather the prevailing
trend.
Generally, any unprivileged false statement made to a third person
concerning and harming a plaintiff's reputation is defamatory.2 A desire
to harm the plaintiff is not necessary to establish intent. The plaintiff
need only prove that the defendant intended to communicate the state-
ment to a third party.3 When applied to fiction, however, these decep-
tively lucid rules become muddled and inequitable. Bindrim illustrated
these problems in a decision that potentially exposed authors to indis-
criminate libel suits.
* B.A., Motion Pictures/Television, University of California, Los Angeles, 1987; Mem-
ber, Second Year Class. The author would like to thank Shannon Underwood for her encour-
agement and assistance in preparing this Note. This Note received first place in the I.H.
Prinzmetal Writing Competition, sponsored by the Beverly Hills Bar Association.
1. Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 984 (1979).
2. W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 773-78 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
W. PROSSER]. This Note uses "libel" and "defamation" interchangeably. "Libel" is a form of
defamation that refers to written false statements of fact which injure another. Id. at 785-86.
Libel may also be applied to defamatory statements made within a theatrical production, mo-
tion picture, or teleplay. Id. at 786.
3. Id. at 808-09.
I
The Birth of Bindrim
A. Factual Background
The story behind Bindrim is as unusual as its holding. After partici-
pating in a nude encounter therapy program, author Gwen Mitchell
wrote a novel, Touching, which was set in a fictional group engaged in
nude encounter therapy.4 Touching portrayed nude encounter therapy
negatively. Dr. Simon Herford, the leader of the fictional encounter
group, was a raunchy, foul-mouthed psychiatrist.5 Paul Bindrim, the
clinical psychologist who led the actual encounter group, sued Mitchell
alleging that Dr. Herford was identified with him and that this identifica-
tion constituted libel. Bindrim denied that he ever acted in Dr. Herford's
crude fashion.6
The trial court agreed with Bindrim, though he shared few similari-
ties with Dr. Herford other than being a leader of a nude encounter
group. Herford was a psychiatrist; Bindrim was a clinical psychologist.7
Herford was described as a "fat Santa Claus type with long white hair,
white sideburns, a cherubic rosy face;" Bindrim was clean shaven with
short hair.' Their names did not sound similar. Yet, the trial and appel-
late courts were not impressed with the differences between Bindrim and
Herford as precluding identification. Three witnesses claimed they had
identified the fictional character with the real life psychologist.9
B. The Law
Defamation has consistently been a particularly sensitive area be-
cause of its potential to chill the dissemination of information. By hold-
ing an author liable for his statements, a disgruntled person,
organization, or government could effectively constrict criticism if libel
suits were not curbed by the rights of free speech and free press guaran-
teed by the first amendment. An encapsulated interpretation of the
United States Supreme Court ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 10
states that:
[T]here can be no liability for defamation of a public figure unless the
plaintiff demonstrates: (1) that the statement is false; (2) that the con-
tent defamed plaintiff's reputation; (3) that the alleged defamatory
statement is 'of and concerning' the plaintiff; and (4) that the defend-
4. Bindrim, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 69-70, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
5. Id. at 70-71, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 34-35.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 75, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 86, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
10. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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ant acted with knowledge that the statement was false or acted in reck-
less disregard of the truth.'"
Also, it must be shown that a reasonable person would rely on the de-
famatory statement as a true portrayal of the plaintiff. The plaintiff must
prove this objective standard.1
2
Libel suits would have a "chilling effect" upon open debate if the
standards of defamation did not obligate a high level of scrutiny. First
amendment concerns demand that the law protect the freedom to write
without reprisal by giving these expressions "breathing space" in order to
survive. I3 Therefore, to be liable, the defendant must have acted with the
requisite level of fault. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. "4 applied the New
York Times standard to a private individual who was not a public figure.
Although the Gertz Court emphasized the need to protect the "vigorous
exercise of [f]irst [a]mendment freedoms," the private plaintiff does not
have to prove "actual malice." 5
In both New York Times and Gertz, the Supreme Court held that in
order to provide adequate protection to the flow of information in soci-
ety, all communications, including those that are fictional, must be given
a wide margin of liberality. A plaintiff's disdain for a particular publica-
tion is insufficient to establish a cause of action. Allusions and inaccura-
cies within a publication do not necessarily entitle the plaintiff to a
judgment; some falsehood must be protected.6 The plaintiff must meet
the standards set out in New York Times. Bindrim, however, narrowly
interpreted this wide margin of liberality, effectively reading it out of the
law. Circular reasoning dominated the majority opinion. Justice Files
dissented, criticizing these flaws: "Those practices which are similar to
plaintiff's technique are classified as identifying. Those which are unlike
plaintiff's are called libelous because they are false. Plaintiff has . . .
spurious logic ... ,, " Fiction by its very definition connotes that the
artist has deliberately stated a falsehood. To infer actual malice because
the novel was false is absurd.'" Thus, if liberality is not applied, a plain-
tiff asserting defamation through a fictional work need only prove that in
some small way the statement was "of and concerning" him.
11. Rich & Brillant, Defamation in Fiction: The Limited Viability ofAlternative Causes of
Action, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 5 (1986).
12. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 809.
13. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72.
14. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
15. Id. at 348-49.
16. Id. at 341.
17. Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 86, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 44, cert. denied, 444
U.S. 984 (1979) (Files, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 88, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 44-45.
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The plaintiff's task is made easier because general damages are pre-
sumed when asserting libel.' 9 Bindrim, therefore, did not need to show
specific injuries. Three witnesses who were familiar with Bindrim's work
in nude encounter therapy testified that they identified Herford with Bin-
drim.2' Although the court recognized that defamation could be sus-
tained if only one person received and believed the plaintiff to be the
subject of the defamatory statement, 2' the majority neglected to ascertain
whether the witnesses accepted the false statements within the novel as a
factual account of Bindrim's actions. Presumably, Bindrim was not
harmed by the statements if none of the witnesses accepted the novel as
truthful. Bindrim's claim of defamation was "limited to the imputation
of vulgar speech and insulting manners ' 22 with no showing that any pur-
ported identification directly harmed his business or reputation.
If a standard could be delineated in Bindrim, the extreme interpreta-
tion of court dicta would be that actual malice may automatically be
inferred from fiction and that demonstration of reliance and actual dam-
ages caused by the fictional work would be unnecessary to support a
claim of defamation. Although courts outside the Second District of
California were not required to follow the case, Bindrim set an important
national precedent. Because the Supreme Court refused to hear the case,
Bindrim effectively broadened the scope of defamation in fiction through-
out the country.
C. The Standard Spreads
In Geisler v. Petrocelli,23 the Second Circuit reversed a trial court's
dismissal of a complaint for failure to assert that allegedly defamatory
material was "of and concerning the plaintiff." The defendant wrote a
novel concerning the odyssey of a female transsexual tennis player
through the allegedly corrupt system of women's professional tennis.24
The work was purportedly fictional, and even carried a disclaimer at the
beginning of the book stating that similarities between characters and
actual people were coincidental.2"
"Melanie Geisler," the tennis player and central character in the
novel, perpetrated fraud on the tennis circuit and was lured into indecent
sexual conduct. "Melanie" was described as "young, attractive, and
19. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 795.
20. Bindrim, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 86, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
21. Id. at 79, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
22. Id. at 85, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
23. 616 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1980).
24. Id. at 638.
25. Id.
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honey-blonde, her body firm and compact .... "26 While the plaintiff,
Melanie Geisler, shared the same name and some of the physical attrib-
utes of the character in the novel, there were many important differences
between the two. The plaintiff was a mother who had worked as a pub-
licity assistant for a small publishing company.27 She did not play pro-
fessional tennis nor was she a transsexual.
The defendant, Petrocelli, however, was acquainted with the plain-
tiff. Both worked for the same publishing company and knew each other
on a casual basis.2" One might assume that he based his character super-
ficially upon the plaintiff, as writers frequently draw upon the people
they meet in day to day living to provide the backdrop for the stories
they tell. One might also assume that fellow co-workers would recognize
Geisler's character traits within Petrocelli's novel. Yet, did Petrocelli in-
tend his tennis player to be the plaintiff? Logic would find such an asso-
ciation absurd. The Second Circuit, however, held that as a matter of
law such a question must be given to the jury to decide.29
As in Geisler, the jury in Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd. 30 had
to decide whether a satirical article in Penthouse magazine contained
defamatory statements "of and concerning" the plaintiff, Kimberly
Pring. The article was a fictional parody of the Miss America Pageant
where Miss Wyoming levitated her talent coach by fellatio.3 ' Pring, a
former Miss Wyoming, claimed that "Charlene," the fictional Miss Wyo-
ming, was "of and concerning" her. No particular parallels between
"Charlene" and Kimberly Pring were asserted other than they were both
winners of the Miss Wyoming Pageant who had competed at the Miss
America Pageant performing a baton twirling act.32 No showing was
made that Philip Cioffari, author of the article, even knew of the plaintiff.
Nevertheless, the jury returned a $26.5 million verdict in the plaintiff's
favor.33
Under Bindrim, Geisler, and the trial court decision in Pring, defa-
mation in fiction became far more expansive and muddled. The test the




29. "This points up a disturbing irony inherent in the scheme .... (T]he more deserving
the plaintiff of recompense for the tarnishing of a spotless reputation, the less likely will be any
actual recovery. Such a seeming contradiction is best resolved by the trier of fact .... Id. at
639.
30. 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982).
31. Id. at 441.
32. Pring v. Penthouse, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1101, 1103 (D. Wyo. 1981).
33. Ashman, First Amendment Shields Sexual Fantasy, 69 A.B.A. J. 218, 220 (1983). The
verdict was later reduced to 12.5 million dollars by the district court.
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the world should understand the libel; it is sufficient if those who knew
the plaintiff can make out that [she] is the person meant.",34 Certainly
Petrocelli meant to describe a Melanie Geisler who was a transsexual
tennis player as much as Cioffari meant to describe a Miss Wyoming
levitating her coach by fellatio. By failing to incorporate reasonableness
of identification upon the allegedly defamatory statements, post-Bindrim
decisions overly broadened the standard of what constituted defamatory
fiction.
II
Potential Problems for Artists
A. Literary Hypotheticals
As any artist would suspect, the expansive application of libel to
fiction would place all writers, producers, and publishers in a vulnerable
position. Fiction is, after all, delicately crafted, acknowledged falsehood.
The artist lies when creating his work, but often draws upon real life for
inspiration.
An expansive standard of defamation becomes extremely problem-
atic when artists seek to allude to factual events or people within their
creations. A roman d clef, a fictional work which incorporates factual
elements, can be very powerful since it allows the reader to identify with
the work by tailoring the work to reflect the reader's own life. Many
world-renowned artists are effective creators of romans d clef.
Problems arise, however, when the actual person objects to the fic-
tional characterization. For example, consider the character of Johnny
Fontane, the popular Italian-American singer in The Godfather who
used his Mafia connections ruthlessly to further his career. Author
Mario Puzo admits that many readers assumed that Fontane was based
upon Frank Sinatra.3" Sinatra was so incensed by the allusion that he
threatened to physically abuse Puzo when the two met at a well-known
Los Angeles restaurant.36 A question thus comes to mind: how many of
the specific attributes of Johnny Fontane would a reasonable person be-
lieve were "of and concerning" Frank Sinatra?
Analysis of a well-known motion picture may answer this question.
Citizen Kane, a fictional story concerning the struggles of an American
billionaire, was based upon the life of William Randolph Hearst. 37 Her-
man Mankiewicz, co-writer of the script with Orson Welles, knew
34. Geisler, 616 F.2d at 639.
35. M. Puzo, THE GODFATHER PAPERS 53 (1972).
36. Id. at 53-55.
37. P. KAEL, Raising Kane, in THE CITIZEN KANE BOOK 63 (1971).
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Hearst's mistress, Marion Davies and the intimate details of the Hearst-
Davies relationship. 8 Welles and Mankiewicz wrote the fictional story
of Charles Foster Kane and his mistress Susan Alexander, closely paral-
leling the actual lives of Hearst and Davies.
Kane was the leader of a newspaper empire as was Hearst. Both
were ruthless in hiring and firing their editorial staff. Both were avid
collectors of world artifacts and both built palatial homes to house their
treasures.39 Both used their positions as newspaper editors to foment
war with Latin American nations in order to increase newspaper reve-
nues. 4° Both attempted to enter politics, with their respective attempts
ending in scandal.4 '
Susan Alexander and Marion Davies shared a love of jigsaw puzzles
and a love of the stage. Kane sponsored Alexander's operatic career and
Hearst frequently subsidized and promoted Davies' motion pictures.42
Welles and Mankiewicz even drew upon intimate details of the Hearst-
Davies relationship which were not publicly known.43
In spite of the unflattering similarities between Citizen Kane's fic-
tional characters and the actual people they were based upon, Kane and
Alexander possess qualities which could only be dubiously attributed to
Hearst and Davies. Kane had a violent temper. He slapped Alexander"
and tore up her room "in a truly terrible and absolutely silent rage."
'45
Alexander was portrayed as a depressed, "cheaply blonded" alcoholic.'
When she failed to achieve success as a singer, she attempted suicide.47
Could or should these character traits be attributed to Hearst or
Davies? Before 1979, Hearst and Davies would need to show that Kane
and Alexander paralleled their identities to a striking degree. Although
there were many similarities between fictional character and actual per-
son, several differences precluded identification past mere allusion. Pre-
sumably, the label "fiction" would clue the viewer to not absorb the story
as fact. Under Bindrim, however, either Hearst or Davies could success-
fully seek damages from Welles, Mankiewicz, or anyone else responsible
for the creation of Citizen Kane.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 64.
41. Id. at 61.
42. Id. at 68-69.
43. Before "Rosebud" was the name of Kane's sled, it was Hearst's nickname for Davies'
clitoris. K. ANGER, HOLLYWOOD BABYLON 11 159 (1984).
44. H. MANKIEWICZ & 0. WELLES, The Shooting Script, in THE CITIZEN KANE BOOK
269 (1971).
45. Id. at 279.
46. Id. at 237-40.
47. Id. at 257-58.
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Several legal scholars have recognized this problem and some have
suggested that courts should define "malice" as common malice, 48 as op-
posed to the legal definition which incorporates a lower threshold of in-
tent. 9 The difficulty in applying this standard is that often an artist does
have common malice when creating the work. This is especially true
when the artist seeks to point out a social injustice or stir the public to
action.
In The Jungle, for example, Upton Sinclair sought to expose the
shoddy conditions under which companies processed meat. This turn-of-
the-century novel is the fictional story of Lithuanian immigrants whose
American dreams are crushed within the sweatshop system of American
slaughterhouses.s The plot, however, is a mere pretext to describe the
disgusting conditions of meat processing at that time. 51
The novel's immense worldwide appeal resulted in substantial re-
forms within the meat processing industry. In the United States, the
book inspired President Theodore Roosevelt and Congress to pass the
first enforceable national Pure Food and Drug Act.52 Indeed, few would
argue the immense social benefits The Jungle wrought, yet under the Bin-
drim rule, 4 company like the Armour Corporation might have a cause
of action against Sinclair for defamation. 53 Armour need only show that
someone identified Armour with the fictional slaughterhouse and that
aspects of the fictional slaughterhouse did not apply in whole to Armour.
B. How These Problems Were Handled in the Past
Defamation in fiction did not spring from the loins of Bindrim, as
many may be inclined to believe. Before Bindrim, however, the plaintiff
had to sustain a high burden of proof demonstrating that the fictional
material was not merely alluding to the plaintiff, but was so descriptive of
the plaintiff that the reader would perceive the fiction as fact.
In Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co. , the defendant wrote a novel de-
picting a corrupt magistrate named Corrigan who sat in the Jefferson
48. "Malice" is commonly defined as "[a] disposition or indication of anger, jealousy,
hatred, revenge, or the like; active malevolence." FUNK AND WAGNALLS, NEW STANDARD
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1498 (1931).
49. See Rosen & Babcock, Of and Concerning Real People and Writers of Fiction, 7 HAS-
TINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 221, 261-63 (1985).
50. L. HARRIS, UPTON SINCLAIR: AMERICAN REBEL 71-76 (1975).
51. "The hogs that arrived already dead of cholera and tubercular steers were processed
and sold for human consumption as were 'old and crippled and diseased cattle ... covered
with boils.'" IM. at 73.
52. Id at 90.
53. Armour was among a small group of meat processing giants in existence at the time
Sinclair first published his novel. Id. at 68.
54. 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920).
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Market Court in New York City. The plaintiff, Corrigan, was a magis-
trate in that court." The case held that the defendant intentionally and
vindictively wrote the character into his novel in order to expose the
plaintiff to contempt and ridicule. Similar name, same occupation, and
same place of employment--coupled with the fact that the defendant had
previously come before the plaintiff in a criminal proceeding-estab-
lished the inference that the character in the book was of and concerning
the plaintiff.56
Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co. " likewise was concerned with
whether a jury could reasonably find that an alleged libel referred to the
plaintiff. In the defendant's book, The Travelers, the central character,
Maxim, abandoned his dying father in order to serve a Nazi organization
for easy profit.58 The author of the book, plaintiff's brother, conceded
that the novel "was about our father, the family concerts and me."59
Indeed, the parallels between the plaintiff and Maxim were not merely
similar, but striking. The story centers around a Latvian family of thir-
teen children traveling around Europe in an old bus giving concerts. The
father is a protestant minister who owns a home in Stockholm. Maxim,
the oldest son, is twenty-three years old in 1938 and is responsible for
taking care of the family. All of the above literary structures parallel the
plaintiff's life.6'
After considering these parallels and the defendant's acknowledged
basis for the story, the Second Circuit found that a reasonable person
could understand the character Maxim to be the plaintiff. "It is obvious
that there are few, if any, other families with a minister father and thir-
teen children in which the third, fourth, and eighth are girls and the
eldest a son with great responsibility, who toured Europe in a bus in the
1930's giving family concerts."61
Contrast Corrigan and Fetler with Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co. ,62
in which the plaintiffs claimed the novel and movie Anatomy of a Murder
defamed them. The story was based upon an actual murder and subse-
quent trial. The fictional plot in many ways paralleled the actual occur-
rence in its locale and sequence of events and many of the fictional
characters were readily identifiable with their living counterparts. 63
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 364 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1966).




62. 300 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1962).
63. Id. at 375-76.
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The Seventh Circuit, however, refused to find that a reasonable per-
son would identify the unsavory characters with the plaintiffs upon
whom they were based. Wheeler, the actual victim's wife, alleged that
she was portrayed through the character "Janice" as a foul-mouthed wo-
man who bore her child out of wedlock." Nevertheless, the court held
that the author so clearly distinguished the physical traits and personal-
ity of "Janice" that no one could reasonably understand the character to
be a portrayal of Wheeler. "[A]ny reasonable person who read the book
and was in a position to identify Hazel Wheeler with Janice Quill would
more likely conclude that the author created the latter in an ugly way so
that none would identify her with Hazel Wheeler."65
III
The Tide Turns Back
A. Humor Gets the Last Laugh
Clearly, the holding in Wheeler is inimical to that in Bindrim.
Where the Wheeler court found unflattering characterizations to be use-
ful devices precluding identification with the plaintiff, the Bindrim court
viewed them as the basis upon which libel could be asserted.
Reaction to Bindrim and its progeny was immediate. Writers and
publishers became vulnerable targets for any disgruntled reader's asser-
tion that the novel, movie, or cartoon "was about me." A plethora of
legal scholars warned of decisions which "could chill the creation or
dissemination" of fiction,66 declaring that "[s]uch outrageous verdicts in-
hibit an author's freedom of expression."67 However, in spite of concerns
for first amendment protection, predictions of impending disaster were
premature. This was due in part to the healing powers of the courts to
rectify bad law, and in part to the reluctance of artists, when faced with
legal mumbo-jumbo, to honestly give a damn.
A slow recision to pre-Bindrim standards began with the Tenth Cir-
cuit's reversal of the Pring verdict. The court recognized that in many
instances readers do not understand words in their literal sense when
writers use them for obvious exaggeration. Similarly, cases involving hu-
morous and satirical works should not be decided based upon their literal
statements if no one could reasonably understand these statements to de-
64. Id. at 374.
65. Id. at 376.
66. Garbus & Kurnit, Libel Claims Based on Fiction Should be Lightly Dismissed, 51
BROOKLYN L. REV. 401, 421 (1985).
67. Note, Defamation in Fiction: the Needfor a New Test, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 449
(1984).
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scribe actual facts.6" "The charged portions of the story described some-
thing physically impossible in an impossible setting.... It is impossible
to believe that anyone could understand that levitation could be accom-
plished by oral sex before a national television audience or anywhere
else."69 The appellate court set aside the verdict for the plaintiff and
dismissed the action.
The Tenth Circuit's decision emphasized an important detail which
was absent from the trial court's consideration. The plaintiff may have
proven that a third person would understand that the fictional character
was based upon plaintiff's performance at the Miss America Pageant, but
she could not prove that a reasonable person would understand the fic-
tional statements as fact.7° Subsequently, courts in many jurisdictions
looked to whether a reasonable person would rely upon the characteriza-
tion as actually reflecting the traits of the plaintiff.
Indeed, lack of reasonable reliance upon statements made in a Sat-
urday Night Live comedy skit exonerated the defendant in Frank v. Na-
tional Broadcasting Co.7 The plaintiff, Maurice Frank, was a tax
consultant who charged that he was identified with a character in "Satur-
day Night News," a parody of a standard television news broadcast. The
character, "Fast Frank," shared the plaintiff's full name and allegedly
bore a physical resemblance with the plaintiff.72 "Fast Frank" gave tax
advice which the plaintiff described as "ludicrously inappropriate"
thereby holding the plaintiff up to ridicule." A sample of "Fast Frank's"
material:
Here are some write-offs you probably aren't familiar with.... Got a
houseplant? A Ficus, a Coleus, a Boston Fern-doesn't matter. If you
love it and take care of it-claim it as a dependent. Got a horrible
acne? ... use a lotta Clearasil ... that's an Oil-Depletion Allowance.
You say your wife won't sleep with you? You got withholding tax
coming back. If she walks out on you-you lose a dependent. But...
it's a home improvement-write it off. 71
The test used by the court to determine if the skit constituted defa-
mation was whether the plaintiff could prove that the statements exposed
him to public contempt or ridicule in the minds of right thinking persons,
thereby depriving him of their friendly intercourse in society." The
court assumed, without deciding, that the defendants intended to portray
68. Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 442 (10th Cir. 1982).
69. Id. at 443.
70. Id. at 439-40.
71. 119 A.D.2d 252, 506 N.Y.S.2d 869 (1986).
72. Id. at 254, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 870.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 255, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 871.
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the plaintiff in the skit,76 but found that reliance upon the tax advice
would be unreasonable because no sensible person would believe the
statements to be true." The court thus granted humor and satire greater
deference than melodramatic works, provided no reasonable person
could take the statements made as fact. The court, however, did not give
humor and satire blanket protection. It reserved the right to find a work
so vicious a personal attack that it would grant relief to the plaintiff.7"
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,79 however, indicated that even vindic-
tive attacks may be protected by the first amendment if they are not sus-
ceptible to interpretation as fact. In Falwell, the Supreme Court upheld
the rationale of Pring and Frank. A plaintiff must demonstrate that a
person could reasonably interpret the statements made as fact in order to
prevail.80 The Court held that a satirical piece of fiction was protected by
the first amendment even though it specifically mentioned the plaintiff, a
public figure, by name.8'
Although the Court based its ruling upon plaintiff's assertion of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress rather than his libel claim, the
Court's dicta reaffirmed the need to protect humor. Satire and criticism
of public figures have long been part of the American tradition of free
government.82 To set a standard where certain types of critical humor
are not protected would result in liability contingent upon a jury's partic-
ular views.8 3
The statements made by Hustler Magazine were labeled fiction; be-
cause of their absurdity, no reasonable person would interpret the state-
ments made to be truthful. In order for a public figure plaintiff to
recover, there must be a showing that the false declarations were made
with a "heightened level of culpability."8 4 Knowing or reckless conduct
in asserting a falsity as fact is actionable.8 5 Here, however, the Court
found that no attempt was made by the defendants to assert that the
statements were fact. Therefore, the statements were protected not as
false declarations which no one would reasonably believe, but as opinion
protected under the first amendment.8 6
76. Id. at 256, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
77. Id. at 259, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
78. Id. at 256-58, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 872-73.
79. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
80. Id. at 57.
81. Id. at 48.
82. Id. at 54.
83. Id. at 55.
84. Id. at 49.
85. Id. at 56.
86. Id. at 51-52.
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The decisions in Pring, Frank and Falwell indicate an author writing
a piece of humor has a great deal of protection from libel suits, provided
the work could not reasonably be understood as presenting reality.
Although Falwell specifically reserved application of first amendment
protection to satirical pieces based upon non-public figures, Pring and
Frank indicate that such protection should apply.
B. Subsequent Protection of Drama
The law protects comedy more than drama. Humor and satire in-
herently tell the reader not to take the statements made in earnest.
Drama, on the other hand, relies upon the reader's intellect to discern
truth from fantasy. Although dramatic works are still vulnerable, they
have gained considerable protection from libel suits in the past eight
years.
Springer v. Viking Press 7 was one of the first cases to return to the
pre-Bindrim standards of defamation in fiction. Defendant Tine ac-
knowledged that he had loosely patterned the relationship of the hero
and the heroine in his book, State of Grace, on the former relationship
between himself and the plaintiff, Lisa Springer."8 Springer and Tine's
relationship ended acrimoniously and the allegedly defamatory character
reflected Tine's hostility toward Springer.
The character, Lisa Blake, was the sexually aberrant "whore" of a
ruthless Italian industrialist.89 Springer and Blake shared the same first
name, similar physical characteristics, lived on the same street, and were
college-educated.9 Mutual friends of Springer and Tine recognized that
Tine based Blake's character, superficially at least, upon plaintiff
Springer. One wrote: "I have read Robbie's book and am absolutely
amazed that he has put Lisa into it-under her own namel-as a psychol-
ogy student who has become a high-class prostitute. What a childish
revenge!"91
In spite of the strong testimony of defendant and witnesses that Lisa
Blake was a manifestation of Lisa Springer, the coUrt field ihat such a
conclusion was unreasonable due to profound dissirilarities between the
two. Springer was a college tutor presumably living off a modest in-
come,92 whereas Blake was an affluent woman living in luxury.93 No
87. 90 A.D.2d 315, 457 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1982).
88. Id. at 316, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 319, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 249.
91. Id. at 321, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 250.




reasonable person would impute sexual promiscuity to Springer based
upon the character in defendant's novel.
Even the California Second Appellate District retreated from the
ruling it espoused in Bindrim. In Aguilar v. Universal City Studios,
Inc. , the court refused to overrule a summary judgment granted to the
defendant in a lawsuit involving alleged defamation in a fictional motion
picture. The plaintiff, Bertha Aguilar, argued that the character "Ber-
tha" in Luis Valdez' play and motion picture Zoot Suit defamed her.
Zoot Suit was based upon the Sleepy Lagoon murder trials and ensuing
gang riots. 95 The character referred to was "a fornicating woman of
loose morals"96 who was heavily involved in gang activity.
Numerous similarities identified Aguilar with the character. They
shared the same name and grew up in the same neighborhood with mem-
bers of the 38th Street Gang. Both shared some minor role within the
unfolding events which led up to the "zoot suit" riots.9 7 Aguilar, how-
ever, was not involved in the same sordid gang activity as "Bertha." 98
Yet, in spite of Aguilar's identification with the character, the court
distinguished Bindrim, neither overturning nor applying it to the case.
Although "[c]lose parallels between real and fictional events may estab-
lish a reasonable belief in identity despite the author's efforts to hide the
real person through alteration of name or physical appearance," 99 the
court looked to pre-Bindrim decisions; the several points of similarity
between Aguilar and "Bertha" were not enough to establish identifica-
tion within the reasonable person's mind.
Why the different outcome? Certainly Bindrim and Aguilar in-
volved group-specific situations in which only a relatively small number
of people were involved in the actual event from which the fictional story
was derived. Identification with particular individuals would be easier to
achieve within a small group setting as opposed to the world in general.
One possible answer is that the court took into account Luis Valdez'
testimony that he was unaware of Aguilar's role in the Sleepy Lagoon
murder when he wrote Zoot Suit 10 and, therefore, was reluctant to find
actual malice.
Another possibility, one supported by a large volume of dicta, is that
the court returned to a more strict requirement of reasonable identifica-
tion between the plaintiff and the fictional character. One witness, who
94. 174 Cal. App. 3d 384, 219 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1985).
95. Id. at 386, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 390, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 389, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
100. Id. at 391, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
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made such an identification, did not actually rely on the portrayal of
"Bertha" as being a true description of Aguilar twenty-five years previ-
ous.'0 1 The court therefore found the differences between "Bertha" and
Aguilar to be determinative and held that no reasonable identification
could be established.
As the courts continued to further narrow the application of libel to
fiction, artists began to rely more and more upon fact as a substantial
basis for their stories. Zoot Suit and a plethora of motion pictures, plays,
and other works of art became part of a trend to incorporate real charac-
ters and situations, disguising these factual elements in a thin web of fic-
tion. One need only look at the latest TV Guide to see that modem
television is dominated by the "docudrama," a fictional interpretation of
an actual event. These programs usually focus upon a sensational inci-
dent or a matter of public concern.
The motion picture Missing is one such docudrama. In the spirit of
Upton Sinclair's The Jungle, Missing chronicles the involvement of the
United States in the overthrow of an independent Latin American gov-
ernment and the murder of a U.S. citizen.1 2 The film is based upon a
true story, but it distorts time and characters into a palatable structure
suitable for its medium and audience. 0 3 As previously argued, under
Bindrim, the creators of such a film would be prone to liability for defa-
mation if a single person could prove that any aspect of an identifying
character did not apply to that person in whole.
This was the situation presented in the Davis v. Costa-Gavras deci-
sions." Three former members of the American delegation to Chile
contended they were defamed by the motion picture because it accused
them of either ordering or approving the order of a U.S. citizen's murder.
During the violent overthrow of Chilean President Allende, an American
journalist, Charles Horman, was killed. In the book, The Execution of
Charles Horman, author Tom Hauser reported that plaintiffs and other
members of the American delegation to Chile were involved in the deci-
sion to kill Horman. Missing is based upon Hauser's research. 105
In the film, Ed and Beth Horman, father and wife of the victim,
search for answers explaining his disappearance. The film opens with a
statement that the film is based upon a true story, but that some of the
names have been changed."°6 No specific mention is made to Chile, Al-
101. Id. at 391, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
102. Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 619 F. Supp. 1372, 1373-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
103. Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 654 F. Supp. 653, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
104. There are two. See notes 102, 103.
105. 619 F. Supp. at 1373-74.
106. Id. at 1374.
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lende, or those specifically involved in the cover-up. However, someone
familiar with American foreign policy at that time would reasonably un-
derstand the references made in the film to be "of and concerning"
American involvement in Chile. The defendants did not deny this con-
tention. Indeed, references made to the particular plaintiffs were thinly
disguised with similar sounding names. Captain Ray Davis was por-
trayed as Captain Ray Tower;107 Frank Purdy was portrayed as Consul
Putnam.108 Unquestionably, these characters were meant to be inter-
preted as the plaintiffs acting as described. Bindrim and Geisler would
infer actual malice because the work was fiction.
The district court, however, refused to allow the method of commu-
nication to determine actual malice. Although the court held that a rea-
sonable person viewing the motion picture would understand Ray Tower
to be Ray Davis acting as described,"° it found no actual malice as a
matter of law. Looking to the "substantial truth" of the statements
made, the court recognized that a docudrama differs from a documen-
tary, the latter being "a film of real people and real events as they occur.
A documentary maintains strict fidelity to fact." 010 Docudramas, on the
other hand, must "utilize simulated dialogue, composite characters, and
a telescoping of events" in order to fit dramatic structure.1"' "[A
docudrama] is a creative interpretation of reality-and if alterations of
fact in scenes portrayed are not made with serious doubts of truth of the
essence of the telescoped composite, such scenes do not ground a charge
of actual malice."
' 12
This "truth of the essence" test is an extremely helpful transmuta-
tion of current defamation standards. If adopted by other courts, this
standard would allow an author to write a socially scathing book in the
vein of Sinclair's The Jungle with substantial protection from nuisance
suits. Considering the general move away from Bindrim's all-inclusive-
ness, it is probable that other courts would look to the substantial truth
of what was said within the fictional work in determining actual malice.
Thus, it is unlikely that a plaintiff who could prove identification with a
fictional character would prevail in the suit if the fictional statements
differ only superficially with the facts.
107. Id. at 1376.
108. Id. at 1383.
109. Id. at 1376.
110. 654 F. Supp. at 658.
111. Id.
112. Id.
[Vol. 12:517HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
POTENTIAL LIBEL IN FICTION
IV
Legal Loose Ends
Incessant thought and change have governed the law of defamation
in fiction since the brief period when Bindrim, Geisler, and Pring reigned
supreme. Undoubtedly, in years to come the boundaries will again be
adjusted and defamation will play a different role in fictional works.
Modern courts seem to be allowing artists greater leeway in utilizing real
people and incidents in their creations. Actual reliance and reasonable-
ness of identification increase the plaintiff's burden to demonstrate that
the declarations are "of and concerning" him.
Yet, in spite of movement toward pre-Bindrim standards, courts un-
evenly protect certain novels, plays, and motion pictures, leaving some
forms of fiction more protected than others. Although humor and satire
are given strong first amendment protection, drama has been given virtu-
ally none.
Judicial protection of humor and satire is nearly complete, provided
the fictional work can only be interpreted as humor or satire. Drama, on
the other hand, is still vulnerable to the attacks of the vindictive and the
greedy. Courts must set clear standards upon which to adjudicate libel
suits based upon dramatic material. The United States Supreme Court is
in the best position to hear such a case and finally overrule Bindrim and
its brood.
Currently, the dramatist has few options to escape liability. The
"truth of the essence" test may assist writers of docudramas or other
works which assert themselves as based on a true story, but the test pro-
vides little protection for works which are based both on fact and fantasy.
No clear standard has been established to evaluate these latter works. In
fact, courts have an inordinate amount of discretion adjudicating




The Supreme Court should adopt a three-pronged test to evaluate
whether a dramatic work constitutes libel. First, if the work purports to
be based on fact, the "truth of the essence" test of Davis v. Costa-Gavras
should be applied. Second, plaintiffs should be required to prove actual,
as well as reasonable, reliance by third parties upon the statements made.
Third, plaintiffs should be required to establish that the author actually
intended his work to portray the plaintiff acting as described. This three-
pronged test would allow the dramatic writer greater leeway in criticiz-
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ing public figures through writing. It would also protect authors from
nuisance suits brought by private figures claiming that coincidental simi-
larities between the plaintiff and a specific character amount to libel.
The general trend has been to narrowly apply libel standards to
works of fiction, but this trend is sporadic. If Bindrim has any substance
at all, it derives from the uncertainty that at any moment a court could
use the case as precedent to assert liability against the author of a movie,
play, or novel. This arbitrary law is inappropriate. Standardization
would better protect the free flow of those ideas contained in fictional
works. Until then, the artist must look to the prevailing law concerning
defamation in fiction-and hope for the best.
